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words to all suspects." 459 U.S. at 564, n. 
15. Since the officer's inquiry was not 
designed to elicit testimonial evidence 
from McAvoy, again no Miranda advice 
was required. 
The right that McAvoy did possess, and 
which was not infringed, was the right not 
to be unreasonably refused counsel if 
requested. In addressing McAvoy's conten-
tions in this regard, the court of appeals 
relied on Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 481 
A.2d 192 (1984), which holds that "a per-
son under detention for drunk driving 
must, on request, be permitted a reasonable 
opportunity to communicate with counsel 
before submitting to a chemical sobriety 
test ... " Id. 300 Md. at 717-18,481 A.2d at 
192 (emphasis added). However, the right 
to counsel is limited only to circumstances 
that "will not substantially interfere with 
the timely and efficacious administration 
of the testing process." Id. Since McAvoy 
had neither requested counsel nor been 
formally charged with a crime, the court 
found that his Sixth Amendment rights 
were also not violated. 
By holding that a suspect is not entitled 
to Miranda advice prior to either a field or 
chemical sobriety test, the court of appeals 
has merely adopted the prevailing law set 
forth by the Supreme Court jn its 
decisions of Berkemer and Neville. The 
decision still insures that a suspect will not 
be deprived of counsel if requested. How-
ever, the court is further guaranteeing that 
persons who drive while intoxicated will 
nonetheless be accountable for such 
imprudent acts. 
- Timothy Mitchell 
Fairchild Space Co. v. Baroffio: "EARLY 
BIRD" EMPLOYEE NOT ELIGIBLE 
FOR WORKERS' COMPENSA nON 
UNDER TIlE COMING AND 
GOING RULE 
In Fatrchild Space Co. v. Baroffio, 77 Md. 
App.494, 551 A.2d 135 (1989), the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
an "early bird" employee who was told by 
her supervisor to report to work early was 
not eligible for workers' compensation for 
injuries sustained on her way to work. As 
a result, the court limited the application 
of the "dual purpose" and "special errand 
or mission" exceptions under the "coming 
and going" rule. 
Susan Baroffio, the appellee, was an 
Associate Contract Administrator for 
Fairchild Space Company, the appellant. 
Her duties sometimes required her to 
work overtime without pay. On Friday, 
September 5, 1986, she was told by her 
supervisor to arrive at work one-half hour 
early on Monday to prepare a presenta-
tion. In preparation for the presentation, 
the appellee worked late on Friday, return-
ed to work on Saturday and worked at 
home on Sunday evening. On Monday, 
Ms. Baroffio left for work one-half hour 
earlier than normal by her usual route and 
was injured in a car accident. 
Ms. Baroffio filed a claim for compensa-
tion with the Maryland Workers' Com-
pensation Commission. The Commission 
made an "Award of Compensation" 
which Fairchild appealed to the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County, which 
affirmed the Commission's award. Fair-
child then appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland where both parties 
agreed to proceed on an expedited appeal 
and an agreed statement of facts. 
To begin its analysis, the court examined 
the language of the "coming and going" 
rule. The court noted that while the 
Workers' Compensation Act was designed 
to provide compensation for work-related 
injuries, injuries sustained while traveling 
to or from the work place are not covered. 
Id. at 497,551 A.2d at 136, (citing, Gilbert 
& Humphreys, Maryland Workers' Com· 
pensation Handbook, §6.6 (1988». There 
are, however, two applicable exceptions to 
this rule which allow an injured employee 
to receive compensation for injuries sus-
tained while coming and going to the 
work place. 
The court first applied the "dual pur-
pose" exception which states: 
Injury during a trip which serves both 
a business and a personal purpose is 
within the course of employment if 
the trip involves the performance of a 
service for the employer which would 
have caused the trip to be taken by 
someone even if it had not coincided 
with the personal injury., 
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
§ 18.00 (1965). If an employee chooses to 
work at home for her convenience, com-
ing and going to work is not for a business 
purpose within the exception. Id., § 18.33 
at 4-316. Based upon this, the court found 
no evidence that Ms. Baroffio was required 
to work at home, rather, it was a matter of 
her personal preference, and concluded 
that her injuries did not fall within the 
dual purpose exception. 
In support of this conclusion, the court 
found Stoskin v. Board of Educ. of Mont· 
gomery County, 11 Md. App. 335, 274 A.2d 
397 (1971) to be directly on point.) In 
Stoskin, a school teacher who was told by 
the principal to study certain books prior 
to the first day of school, attempted to rely 
on the "dual purpose" exception after 
being injured on her way to work. Even 
though the teacher was in the course of her 
employment when reviewing the books, 
the court found no evidence that she was 
required to work at home. The Stoskin 
court found the "dual purpose" exception 
inapplicable because the teacher's review 
ended before she began her trip to work 
the following day. 
The court next proceeded to address the 
appellee's primary argument, that her 
injury was compensable under the "special 
errand or mission" exception. This excep-
tion provides: 
When an employee, having identifia-
ble time and space limits on his 
employment, makes an off-premises 
journey which would normally not be 
covered under the usual going and 
coming rule, the journey may be 
brought within the course of employ-
ment by the fact that the trouble and 
time of making the journey, or the spe-
cial inconvenience, hazard, or urgency 
of making it in the particular cir-
cumstances, is itself sufficiently sub-
stantial to be viewed as an integral part 
of the service itself. 
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation lAw, § 
16.11 (1985). The court rejected this excep-
tion, and noted that the exception usually 
applies to employees who are regularly 
"on call" and are subsequently injured on 
their way to work. Fairchild, 77 Md. App. 
at 500, 551 A.2d at 139. The court of spe-
cial appeals reiterated its finding in Coats & 
Clark's Sales Corp. v. Stewart, 39 Md. App. 
10, 13, 383 A.2d 67, 70 (1978) that "the 
essential characteristic of a special errand 
or mission is that it would not have been 
undertaken except for the obligation of 
employment." 
The court also found Trent v. Collin S. 
Tuttle & Co., 20 A.D.2d 948, 249 N.Y.S. 2d 
140 (1964) persuasive in its rejection of the 
special errand exception. In Trent, an exec-
utive secretary who was required to turn 
in a report early the next day, worked late 
and completed the report at home. She left 
early the following morning and was 
injured on her way to work. The New 
York court rejected her argument that the 
"special errand" exception applied. That 
court held that travel to and from work is 
not a risk of employment unless the 
employee's home is really a second 
employment location where services are 
required to be rendered. Fairchild, 77 Md. 
App. at 502, 551 A.2d at 139. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland applied the New York court's 
rationale and found that Fairchild did not 
require Ms. Baroffio to work at home and 
that the "special errand or mission" excep-
tion to the "coming and going" rule did 
not apply. In so holding, the court has 
declined to expand workers' compensation 
laws to include an employee who is 
required to report to work early. 
- Michael P. Sawicki 
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